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American employment policy for displaced workers started in the Great Depression with 
programs for the employment service, unemployment insurance, work experience, and direct job 
creation.  Assistance for workers displaced by foreign competition emerged in the 1960s along 
with formalized programs for occupational job skill training.  The policy focus on displaced 
workers was sharpened in the 1980s through the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
Act and the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act.  Field experiments 
on services to dislocated workers led to Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services systems 
in all states, and federal rules adopted as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement Act 
permitted UI benefit receipt while starting self-employment.  Evaluation evidence suggests there 
should be continuous connection of unemployment compensation recipients to reemployment 
services, skill training closely connected to employer requirements, earnings supplements to ease 
transitions to different jobs, efforts to maintain and strengthen employer-employee relationships, 
information channels to employees and communities about impending employment disruptions, 
and targeting of services to improve returns on public investments.  While no silver bullet 
emerges to solve worker displacement, many different programs addressing a variety of needs 
can improve labor market outcomes after permanent job loss. 
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Based on remarks made at the Canadian roundtable on displaced workers, Conference 
Centre, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 140 Promenade du Portage, Phase 
IV, Gatineau, Quebec, March 12, 2010.  Opinions are my own and do not reflect the position of 




Evaluations of a wide range of active labor market programs (ALMPs) across a variety of 
countries have produced three essential findings: 1) job search assistance programs are the most 
cost-effective, 2) large-scale public service employment programs are the least cost-effective and 
most costly, and 3) job training programs and employment subsidies fall somewhere in between, 
with the degree of cost-effectiveness dependent on proper targeting of assistance (Schwanse 
2001, p. 22).  These conclusions from the rapporteur at an Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) conference on ALMPs are useful to bear in mind while 
considering programs aimed at providing assistance to workers with long-term job attachment 
who are permanently displaced by mass layoffs or plant closings.   
BACKGROUND 
American employment policy for displaced workers started in the Great Depression and 
has been refined over the years.  The Great Depression yielded the Employment Service (ES), 
created by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933; the federal-state unemployment insurance system 
(UI), created by the Social Security Act of 1935; and some large direct-job-creation efforts, 
which included workplace behavior training and some on-the-job skill training.  Permanent job 
separation on a massive scale spawned the Emergency Conservation Work Act of 1933, creating 
the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 
creating the Works Progress Administration (WPA).  The CCC and WPA were direct job 
creation programs emphasizing income transfer, but the elements of work activity and 
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infrastructure investment provided essential workforce training.  Although it was administered 
by the U.S. Department of Labor, the CCC was directed by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture 
and the Interior and managed by the U.S. Army, which had the equipment and experience to 
manage hundreds of thousands of participants (Perkins 1946).  
Additional income support and job training assistance for workers displaced by foreign 
competition emerged in 1962 as the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Act.  Formalized 
programs for occupational job skill training started that same year with the Manpower 
Development Training Act (MDTA) and continued with the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA) of 1973, which included public service employment.   
Key elements in most recent employment legislation have been sunset and evaluation 
requirements.  The sunset is a date when the program will expire, and the evaluation is intended 
to inform subsequent legislation.  Nascent systems for performance measurement emerged in 
CETA and were codified in the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982.  The JTPA came 
into force at a time of high public concern over permanent job loss from economic restructuring 
fostered by Reagan-era business tax policy changes.   
A wave of programs aimed specifically at helping displaced workers emerged in 
subsequent years.  There were major changes in TAA in 1982.  The Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act was signed into law in 1988 along with the Economic 
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) that same year.  Field 
experiments and valuations of services to dislocated workers led to the UI reforms of 1993 that 
established Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems in all states.  Also in 
1993 federal rules permitting continued weekly UI benefit receipt while pursuing self-
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employment were adopted as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
Each of these programs were policy responses to actual or expected worker dislocation.   
The impact of displacement on the earnings profile of jobless Americans participating in 
MDTA was identified by Ashenfelter (1978).  He noticed a marked decline in earnings in the 
months preceding permanent job loss that led to new job skill training.  This decline has come to 
be known as the “Ashenfelter dip” in earnings.  Research based on UI earnings records of 
Pennsylvania workers during the 1980s, many of whom were affected by restructuring in the 
American steel industry, estimated that permanent job loss resulting from a plant closing or mass 
layoff reduced future earnings by approximately 25 percent (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 
1993).  The negative impact on local communities of massive job and income loss can persist for 
decades. 
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993, p. 685) “find that high-tenure workers separating 
from distressed firms suffer long-term losses averaging 25 percent per year. In addition, we find 
that displaced workers’ losses: (i) begin mounting before their separations, (ii) depend only 
slightly on their age and sex, (iii) depend more on local labor-market conditions and their former 
industries, (iv) are not, however, limited to those in a few sectors, and (v) are large even for those 
who find new jobs in similar firms.”  In other words, they say, “displaced workers future 
earnings losses average 25 percent per year and persist, losses begin before job separation, [and] 
are large even for those who find new jobs in similar firms.” Their research is based on UI 
earnings records from Pennsylvania for the years 1974–1986. 
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WORKER DISPLACEMENT IN THE GREAT RECESSION1 
The economic recession in the United States officially began in December 2007.2  From 
that month until October 2009, the number of unemployed Americans more than doubled, from 
7.5 to 15.7 million.  During that same period, the monthly unemployment rate increased from 4.9 
to 10.2 percent of the labor force.3  These dramatic changes happened in an extremely short 
period of time.  Only one other time since 1948 has the average monthly national unemployment 
rate been higher, and that was during the deep recession of 1982, when the unemployment rate 
hit 10.8 percent, and that level was reached over a time span nearly four years in duration (Figure 
1).  
Figure 1 not only shows peak unemployment over the past 50 years occurring in 1982, 
but illustrates a differing pattern of unemployment over time before and after that date.  The 
unemployment lows during economic expansions were successively higher preceding 1982, and 
the unemployment lows during economic expansions were successively lower in the first two 
economic expansions following 1982.  The year 1982 is also the tipping point in patterns of 
employer dismissals of workers.  Before 1982, temporary furloughs were commonly followed by 
employer recalls.  Permanent industrial restructuring began in the early 1980s and accelerated in 
the following years.  Manufacturing plant closings and mass layoffs mushroomed in the 1980s.  
Unemployment reached a cyclical low in 1989 at 5.3 percent of the labor force; the next business 
expansion resulted in unemployment reaching an even lower 4.0 percent in the year 2000. 
                                                          
1 This section adapted from O’Leary and Eberts (2009).   
2 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business-cycle expansions and contractions, 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. 






The macroeconomic stability after the 1980s has been attributed to a new era of steady 
monetarist economic management.  Credit tightening by the central bank of the United States, 
the Federal Reserve (Fed), in 2001 led to a rise in unemployment followed by a gradual return to 
a low of 4.6 percent in 2006 and 2007.  The previous economic recovery was supported by cuts 
in federal personal-income-tax rates as well as lower interbank-lending-rate targets by the Fed.  
Unemployment remained at historical lows until the tremors of the recent financial crisis began 
to shake markets.  
New claims for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits averaged 322,000 per week from 
2005 through 2007.  In the 52 weeks from the end of October 2008 through the end of October 
2009, UI claims averaged 577,000 per week.  In the week ending 10 days before Barack Obama 
was inaugurated as president of the United States, a total of 956,791 Americans filed new claims 
for UI benefits (USDOL 2010).  The new president seized the initiative to renew employment 
policy, and occupational skill training received prominent attention in the federal 
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macroeconomic stimulus bill called the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 
2009. 
From September 2008 to September 2009 the rate of unemployment rose dramatically, 
from 6.2 to 9.8 percent of the labor force, and the composition of the unemployed changed 
substantially.  The unemployment rate among full-time workers rose from 6.3 to 10.7 percent, 
while for part-time workers unemployment rose from 5.9 to 6.4 percent. During this period there 
also was an increase in the rate of involuntary part-time work by those who would prefer full-
time work (BLS 2008).  
The wave of industrial restructuring starting in the 1980s continued throughout much of 
the remainder of the century.  Compared to the very quick rise in unemployment in 2008 and 
2009, the recent previous recessions occurred during steady decline in manufacturing 
employment and were followed by what came to be known as jobless economic recoveries.  That 
is, unemployment was slow to fall as economic activity resumed.  Economic restructuring 
involved employment shifts across employers and industries, requiring occupational change and 
retraining of the workforce.  The present recession has caused unemployment to rise higher than 
previous recent recessions, and the rise has occurred much more quickly, as unemployment has 
surged at a feverish pace.   
The stock of unemployment at any time is the net result of new inflows from job loss, 
new labor-market entry, and labor-market reentry, minus outflows due to new employment and 
labor force withdrawals.  The rise in unemployment resulting from inflows among the jobless 
swamped all other flows.  In the three months from December 2008 through February 2009, a 
total of 9.8 million new claims for UI were filed.   
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This large and quick rise in unemployment has led some analysts to speculate that the 
current recession is different from the previous two.  Erica Groshen (2009) of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York asserts that “deeper recessions tended to be more cyclical”; 
therefore, a larger share of job separations may have been temporary rather than permanent 
layoffs in such recessions.  She cites job losses in the current recession as being more widely 
diffused across industries and posits that temporary and permanent layoffs may be more 
balanced in this one than in other recent recessions.  The previous recessions were engineered by 
the Fed’s gradually raising the target interbank lending rate 25 basis points every six weeks.  
However, the current wave of layoffs was largely driven by the complete unavailability of credit 
to business at any price.  Businesses that normally manage operating cash flows with bank lines 
of credit found that those sources had evaporated overnight.  Banks were hoarding cash to secure 
their own balance sheets as value in their loan portfolios evaporated. 
Other analysts suggest that a jobless economic recovery might persist for longer than was 
seen in recent recessions.  Writing on the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank’s macroblog, Melinda 
Pitts (2009) cites evidence that very small businesses, employing 50 or fewer persons, 
contributed 45 percent of the nation’s job losses during the first year of the current recession.  
That is significant given the facts that one-third of job growth was attributed to very small firms 
in the expansion preceding the 2001 recession and that only 9 percent of job losses in the 2001 
recession originated in such firms.  Pitts quotes William Dudley, president of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, as saying that as credit worthiness of small-business borrowers has 
deteriorated, “some sources of funding for small businesses—credit-card borrowing and home 
equity loans—have dried up … and, small businesses have few alternative sources of funds.” 
 
8 
Recent data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2009) indicates that 
permanent layoffs as a share of total unemployment have reached an all-time high of over 55 
percent (Figure 2).  This rate had previously only reached as high as 42 percent in 1983, 45 
percent in 1992, and 44 percent in 2003.  The current, dramatically higher rate of permanent 
layoffs suggests a protracted period of high joblessness in the coming months. 
 
POLICY RESPONSE TO WORKER DISPLACEMENT 
Public response to permanent worker displacement in the United States can be grouped 
into four main categories of programs.  These are 1) income replacement policies, including UI, 
TAA, and the experimental reemployment bonus programs; 2) worker adjustment programs such 
as those associated with the WARN Act; 3) labor supply enhancing programs such as the ES and 
job training; and 4) labor demand policies such as self-employment assistance and wage 
subsidies.  The latter group might also include direct job-creation programs for public service 
Figure 2.  Permanent Layoffs as a Percentage of 
















































and public works; these focus on income replacement with the ancillary benefits of adding to 
public infrastructure, amenities, and community-building.  The following review of results 
focuses on the first four groups of programs; the exposition relies on O’Leary and King (2005).   
Income Replacement Policies 
The federal-state UI system was established to provide temporary partial income 
replacement to involuntarily separated workers with strong labor force attachments.  Ancillary 
aims of the American UI system included maintenance of aggregate purchasing power in the 
macroeconomy and strengthening worker-employer attachments through experience rating of 
employer UI taxes for benefit financing.  Research has shown that the availability of UI income 
replacement lengthens unemployment durations beyond what they would be in the absence of 
compensation (Decker 1997).  However, when aggregate unemployment is high and rising, the 
proportion of unemployed workers who are involuntarily jobless rises; hence, income 
replacement and maintenance of aggregate spending power is paramount.  Examining the six 
previous recessions before 2000, Chimerine, Black, and Coffey (1999, p. 68) estimate that the 
average UI income multiplier was 2.15, providing a significant automatic stabilizer to the 
economy.  Targeted group and individual extensions of UI and training assistance are provided 
by trade adjustment programs to those who may suffer long jobless durations even in the absence 
of a general economic decline.  Finally, this section considers reemployment bonuses, which 
change the timing of paying UI benefits in an attempt to counteract work disincentive effects. 
Unemployment Insurance 
In terms of exposure to hardship from job loss, the increase in the share of long-term 
unemployment is an informative measure.  With long-term joblessness defined as a person’s 
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being more than six months out of work, the rate of long-term joblessness increased from 21.2 
percent of all unemployed in September 2008 to 35.6 percent of all unemployed in September 
2009 (BLS 2009).  In the United States, the maximum duration of entitlement to regular 
unemployment insurance benefits is 26 weeks in all but two states, where it is 30 weeks.  During 
the recent recession, more than half of all UI beneficiaries exhausted their entitlement to regular 
UI benefits.   
Since 1960, the labor-force share of workers covered by UI has trended upward.  Today 
nearly all wage and salary employers are required to pay UI taxes on their payrolls, and 
employees covered by UI included 86.8 percent of the labor force in 2008.  The majority of 
workers not covered by UI work in self-employment; others working on family farms or for 
churches.  The dramatic rise in UI coverage—from 57.7 percent of the labor force in 1960—
resulted mainly from 1972 UI reforms that brought nonprofit and governmental agency 
employers under the system.  
Despite the broadened coverage, the ratio of insured to total unemployed has been cut in 
half—from 86 in 1960 to 43 percent in 2008 (Figure 1).  The declines were sharpest in the 1960s 
and fell again in the 1970s.  The reduced share of jobless workers receiving UI benefits dampens 
the strength of the UI system to inject spending during economic downturns, thereby acting as an 
automatic macroeconomic stabilizer.  As a share of aggregate economic activity, measured by 
gross domestic product (GDP), total UI benefits have been declining in importance (Figure 3).   
Since 1965, UI benefits as a share of GDP have ranged between 0.16 and 1.16 percent.  
The highest rates occur during recessions, when GDP is depressed and UI benefit payments have 
increased.  Since the peak of 1.16 percent in 1975, the subsequent recessions have seen UI-GDP 
ratios at successively lower cyclical peaks, reaching 0.79 percent in 1982, 0.64 percent in 1992, 
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and 0.40 in 2002.  After the 1982 recession, when many states were forced to borrow from the 
federal government to pay UI benefits, several states increased their UI eligibility requirements.   
This lowered UI recipiency rates and reduced the countercyclical effectiveness of the UI 
system to inject significant amounts of UI benefits automatically during economic recessions.4  
As a percentage of GDP, UI has made up a larger share during the current recession.  
This is both because GDP has declined and because there have been huge increases in the 
number of beneficiaries and their average duration of benefit receipt.  Additionally, there have 
been a series of federally financed UI benefit extensions for exhaustees of the regular 26-week 
entitlement.  These amount to two extensions of up to 20 weeks and a third adding up to 13 
weeks, depending on the level of unemployment in a state, meaning that the maximum potential 
duration of benefits in many states with high unemployment is now 79 weeks.  As 
                                                          
4 Recent estimates based on five post-World War II recessions suggest that a spending multiplier of UI 
benefits is 2.15 during periods of high unemployment.  That means that each $1.00 of UI benefits received by the 
unemployed acts to increase gross domestic product (GDP) by $2.15 through respending in the economy.   
Figure 3.  UI Benefit Payments as a Percentage of










































unemployment continues to rise, Congress has just passed another extension of UI benefits, 
adding 20 weeks of benefits in states with unemployment over 8.5 percent and 14 weeks of 
benefits in other states.  President Obama signed this benefit extension into law on Friday, 
November 7, 2009.  The total amount of UI paid out in the 12 months ending June 30, 2009 was 
$75.0 billion in regular UI benefits, plus more than $34.7 in federally funded extended benefits.5  
That total is 0.77 percent of GDP at the $14.3 billion annual rate estimated in October 2009 
(BEA 2009). 
Regarding UI for jobless workers, the main elements of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, signed by President Obama in February of that year, include 
provisions to do the following: 
 Continue federally funded extended UI benefits for up to 33 weeks, through 
December 31, 2009, at a cost of $27 billion.  Subsequently extended to December 
31, 2010. 
 
 Increase UI benefit amounts by $25 per week through June 30, 2010, at a cost of 
$9 billion.  Subsequently extended to December 31, 2010. 
 
 Make a $7 billion distribution from the Unemployment Trust Fund, of the type 
granted by the Reed Act, to states having legal provisions for items listed in the 
McDermott Unemployment Insurance Modernization Act.  The money would be 
allocated to the states based on their share of the nation’s unemployment.  States 
would receive one-third of their allocation for having an alternate base period 
(ABP) for monetary determination of UI eligibility.6  The remaining two-thirds 
would be granted for having two of the following four provisions: 1) permitting 
claimants who normally work part-time jobs to be seeking only part-time work as 
reemployment, 2) permitting eligibility for job separations due to employer 
harassment or compelling family reasons, 3) having allowances of at least $15 per 
                                                          
5 In addition to fully paying for benefits under the permanent extended benefits program, the federal 
government has also fully paid for a series of extended UI benefits programs.  As of September 16, 2009, the 
funding levels are as follows: Tier 1, $21.6 billion; Tier 2, $6.5 billion; ARRA April, $0.4 billion; ARRA May, $1.1 
billion; ARRA June, $1.9 billion; and ARRA July, $3.3 billion; for a total of $34.7 billion (USDOL 2009). 
6 The UI base period is the time frame over which prior earnings are examined to determine an individual’s 
UI eligibility and benefit entitlement.  The standard base period (SBP) is the first four of the five most recently 
completed calendar quarters.  The alternate base period (ABP) would be the four most recently completed calendar 




dependent up to at least $50 total per week, and 4) giving job search waivers for 
26 weeks to beneficiaries involved in commissioner-approved job training.   
 
 Pay Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) costs to extend 
health insurance coverage to the unemployed, lengthening the period of COBRA 
coverage for older and tenured workers beyond the 18 months provided under 
current law.7 Specifically, workers 55 and older, and workers who have worked 
for an employer for 10 or more years, will be able to retain their COBRA 
coverage until they become Medicare-eligible or secure coverage through a 
subsequent employer.  In addition, the bill subsidizes the first 12 months of 
COBRA coverage for eligible persons who have lost their jobs on or after 
September 1, 2008, at a 65 percent subsidy rate, the same rate provided under the 
health coverage tax credit for unemployed workers under the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program.  The estimated cost of all this is $30.3 billion. 
 
 Provide 100 percent federal funding through 2010 for optional state Medicaid 
coverage of individuals (and their dependents) who are involuntarily unemployed 
and whose family income does not exceed a state-determined level but is no 
higher than 200 percent of poverty, or who are receiving food stamps.    
Trade Adjustment Assistance 
The current Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program was created by the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) and substantially modified by the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 
93-618). The North American Free Trade Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance 
program (NAFTA-TAA) was created by the North American Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182). Both are entitlement programs. Since it began, TAA has 
shifted from being a program that was little used in the 1960s to a program covering 
manufacturing, particularly the steel and automobile industries, in the late 1970s to early 1980s, 
and light-industry and apparel workers in the mid- to late 1990s. The estimated number of 
                                                          
7 The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1986 gave workers and their families 
who lose their health benefits because of a job separation the right to continue health benefits provided by the group 
health plan of their prior employer for limited periods of time.  The separating employees who choose to continue 
coverage must pay the health insurance premium themselves. 
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workers covered by program certifications peaked at almost 705,000 in fiscal year 1980, which 
was largely a reflection of layoffs experienced in the auto and steel industries.8   
In its current form, TAA provides extended income replacement payments like UI to 
trade-impacted unemployed workers who have exhausted their 26 weeks of regular UI benefits.  
These income-support payments, called Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRAs), are paid at 
weekly rates equivalent to UI and are available during job search and participation in job skill 
retraining.  Current durations of TRAs effectively extend UI by up to 130 weeks for eligible 
displaced workers in full-time training and by up to 156 weeks if remedial training is also 
necessary. 
The TAA program also currently provides an allowance for direct job-search expenses of 
up to $1,500 and an allowance for relocation for reemployment or job search of up to $1,500, the 
federal employee limit for relocation expenses.  Expenses are also paid for participation in job 
skill training, which may be full-time or part time, but full-time training is required for TRA 
eligibility.  An 80 percent tax credit is also provided under the health coverage tax credit 
(HCTC) for expenses associated with extending health insurance coverage during joblessness, as 
covered by the TAA program. 
Certification for TAA is by employer, but displaced workers age 50 or over may be 
eligible for Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance (RTAA).  Participants are eligible for 
for job skill training support, TRA, and the HCTC.  Combined benefits under RTAA are capped 
at $12,000 over a period of up to two years.    
Decker and Corson (1995) evaluate the marginal effects of significant TAA expansions 
instituted in 1988, during a period of major displaced-worker policy innovation.  They use 
                                                          
8 This synopsis of the TAA legal evolution is drawn from USDOL (2010). 
 
15 
samples from before and after the 1988 changes in a quasi-experimental evaluation design.  They 
estimate that displaced workers suffered large income losses, but that the expanded TAA job 
training had no significant impact on earnings within three years after TAA participation.   
Reemployment Bonuses 
Regular UI benefits are financed by employer payroll taxes in all states, plus employee 
taxes in Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  As social insurance UI provides temporary 
income support during involuntary joblessness.  For a given tax burden, more people can be 
served if average UI durations are shorter.  For the 12 months ending April 2009, regular UI 
benefit payments totaled $56.6 billion and had an average duration of 15 weeks.  Shortening UI 
average durations by one week would save about $3.75 billion, meaning that more people could 
be served by UI under a given tax burden, or that for a given level of insured unemployment 
more money could remain in the hands of employers for business investment and job creation.  
The reemployment bonus experiments investigated the efficacy of incentive payments to shorten 
UI durations. 
Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment bonus experiments targeted at 
unemployment insurance (UI) recipients were conducted in the United States.  These 
experiments provided various levels of lump-sum payments to UI recipients who took new, full-
time jobs within 6 to 12 weeks of their benefit application and held those jobs for at least three to 
four months.  Empirical UI research had produced evidence that UI payments might lengthen 
jobless durations beyond what they would be in the absence of UI.9  The purpose of these 
interventions was to learn more about the behavioral response of UI recipients to changes in the 
UI program.  Reemployment bonuses were intended to speed the return to work in a manner that 
                                                          
9 Decker (1997) provides a survey of the UI disincentive literature.   
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would benefit employees, employers, and the government, and would be cost-effective.  UI 
claimants would be better off if they returned to work sooner and found jobs that were similar 
and paid similar wages to the jobs they would have taken in the absence of a bonus offer.  
Employers would be better off if they experienced lower UI payroll taxes.  The government 
would be better off if the cost of the bonus was offset by a decrease in UI benefit payments to 
unemployed workers and an increase in income and other tax contributions by workers during 
their longer period of employment.  
Illinois UI Incentive Experiment.  The first bonus experiment was conducted in Illinois 
during 1984–1985 and was sponsored by the Illinois Department of Employment Security.  Its 
goal was to examine the theoretical and empirical economic implications of a reemployment 
bonus offer to UI claimants and the potential for developing a cost-effective bonus program.  The 
Illinois design provided $500 bonus amount, equivalent to about four weeks of UI benefit 
payment, i.e., 4 times the UI weekly benefit amount (WBA).  To collect a bonus payment, 
treatment group members needed to become reemployed within 11 weeks of filing their UI 
claims.    
The estimated impact of the Illinois reemployment bonus offer to UI claimants was a 
reduction in the duration of UI compensated unemployment by 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and 
Spiegelman 1987).  This reduction was so great that the reemployment bonus was cost-effective 
to the UI Trust Fund, generating a benefit cost ratio was 2.32.  At the same time, participants 
suffered no reduction in post-unemployment wages, indicating that the bonus offer did not 
reduce job quality. 
New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration.  Independent of the Illinois experiment, 
the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) sponsored a New Jersey UI experiment that included a 
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reemployment bonus treatment group. This project was designed and became operational in 1985 
and 1986, before the results from the Illinois experiment became available.  As such, the New 
Jersey experiment was not designed to replicate or validate the Illinois experiment.  The New 
Jersey bonus offer was designed so that the amount of the offer was tied to a claimant’s 
remaining UI benefit entitlement and the amount paid was larger in cases of more rapid 
reemployment.  The initial bonus offer was one-half of the claimant’s remaining entitlement at 
the time of the offer.  This offer amount remained constant for the first two full weeks after the 
initial offer.  Thereafter the amount of the bonus offer declined by 10 percent of the original 
amount per week, falling to zero by the end of the eleventh full week of the bonus offer.  Initial 
bonus offers in New Jersey averaged $1,644, which was about nine times the UI weekly benefit 
amount.  
The evaluation of the New Jersey experiment suggested that the reemployment bonus, as 
it was implemented in New Jersey, generated modest savings in UI.  Since the cost of offering 
and paying the bonuses exceeded the modest UI savings, the New Jersey bonus was not cost-
effective from the perspective of the UI system. 
Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiments.  In 1987, with the 
evaluation of the Illinois experiment completed and the New Jersey experiment operations over, 
the USDOL sponsored two additional reemployment bonus experiments, one in Pennsylvania 
and the other in Washington state.  In contrast to the Illinois experiment, these later trials 
generated much more modest results.  In the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments the 
bonus offers were set as multiples of the worker’s weekly benefit level.  This design was adopted 
because in the Illinois experiment claimants receiving less than the UI maximum weekly benefit 
responded more strongly to bonus offers than those constrained by the maximum (O’Leary, 
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Spiegelman, and Kline 1995, p. 267).  The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested 
benefit levels that bracketed the Illinois bonus amount (4 × the weekly benefit allowance, or 
WBA) and tested qualifications both similar to the earlier offers and about half as great. 
The resulting designs provided for four treatment groups in Pennsylvania and six in 
Washington.  The dimensions of each design were the level of the bonus (high and low in 
Pennsylvania; high, medium, and low in Washington) and the qualification period or duration of 
the bonus offer (short and long in both states).  While half of the 10 treatments in Pennsylvania 
and Washington were cost-effective to claimants, society, and the government sector as a whole, 
only two of the treatments were cost-effective for the UI system. (Decker and O’Leary 1992, 
1995)  
The relatively weak response to the bonus offer in Pennsylvania and Washington led to a 
reexamination of the powerful Illinois results.  It was discovered that within the designed 
experiment, a second experiment had unintentionally taken place.  In 1984, as Illinois was 
recovering from a major recession, the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) 
was terminated.  This resulted in about half of the claimants studied having 38 weeks of UI 
benefit eligibility, with the remainder being eligible for only 26 weeks of regular UI benefits.  It 
turns out that the mean bonus response of −1.15 weeks in Illinois was made up of a response of 
−1.78 weeks for those eligible for FSC and −0.54 weeks for those not eligible.  The average 
response of −0.54 for the non-FSC sample in Illinois is close to the response observed in 
Pennsylvania and Washington, where the entitled duration of benefits was also similar. 
Among the individual treatments, the impact on weeks of UI benefits ranged from −0.05 
for the low bonus amount–short qualification period offer in Washington to −1.78 for the bonus 
offer to FSC-eligible claimants in Illinois.  Impacts for Pennsylvania tended to fall between those 
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for Illinois and those for Washington.  Overall, a cash bonus can be expected to modestly shorten 
spells of insured unemployment—the mean effect of the offers made in the three states yielded 
about a one-half week reduction in weeks of UI benefits.   
The degree of response to the bonus offer was also examined for important subgroups 
within the sample.  Results from Pennsylvania and Washington suggest that UI claimants in low-
unemployment areas and claimants whose prior employment was in manufacturing tended to 
respond more strongly to the bonus.  However, close inspection of subgroup results reveals one 
main finding:  there is no difference between any pair of subgroups shown that is both 
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three 
experiments.  The implication of this finding is quite striking—the reemployment bonus has a 
remarkably even impact on various subgroups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age, 
race, industrial sector of employment, level of local unemployment, or level of the weekly 
benefit amount. 
O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005) investigate whether targeting reemployment 
bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust 
benefits would reduce benefit payments.  They show that targeting bonus offers with profiling 
models similar to those in state WPRS systems can improve cost-effectiveness.  However, 
estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen for targeting 
is gradually tightened.  The authors find that narrow targeting is not optimal.  The best candidate 
to emerge is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled 
claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.   
Two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost-effectiveness for an operational 
program (Meyer 1995):  First, an actual bonus program could have a displacement effect.  
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Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are offered a bonus increase their rate of reemployment 
at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus.  Second, there is also the risk that an 
operational bonus offer program could induce an entry effect.  That is, the availability of a 
reemployment bonus might result in a larger proportion of unemployed job seekers entering the 
UI system.   
If entry and displacement effects are sizable, actual program cost-effectiveness will be 
lowered.  However, targeting low bonus amount—long qualification period offers to only those 
most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks.  Targeting would introduce uncertainty 
that a bonus offer would be forthcoming upon filing a UI claim, which should reduce the chance 
of a large entry effect.  Also, targeting should reduce any potential for displacement, since a 
smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus offer.10  
Worker Adjustment Policy 
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act was signed into law 
on August 4, 1988, and became effective February 4, 1989.11  The law requires advance notice of 
plant closures and mass layoffs.  The essential WARN rules require 60-day advance notice of 
mass layoffs and plant closing by employers of 100 or more workers.  By WARN definition, 
mass layoffs involve either more than 500 layoffs or at least 50 layoffs if they constitute one-
third or more of an enterprise’s workforce.  Plant closings subject to WARN involve the loss of 
at least 50 jobs over a 30-day period.  Under either circumstance, notification must be given to 
workers, local government officials, and the state’s dislocated worker adjustment unit.   
                                                          
10 Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that a nontargeted bonus offer to all UI claimants could 
increase unemployment durations among those not eligible for UI by between 0.2 and 0.4 weeks.   
11 WARN was established by Public Law 100-379, enacted August 4, 1988, with regulations 20 CFR 639 
in Federal Register Vol. 54, No. 75.  WARN became effective February 4, 1989. 
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A study by the General Accountability Office (GAO 2003) found that in 2001, 1.75 
million workers lost jobs through extended mass layoffs.  These involuntary permanent job 
separations happened through 8,350 plant closures and mass layoffs; of these events, only about 
one-quarter were subject to WARN's advance notice requirements.  The GAO (2003) report 
recommended improved education of employers regarding their WARN responsibilities and 
associated employee rights.  The following are brief summaries of two studies evaluating the 
effects of WARN principles on workers and local communities. 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act 
Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984) examine the effects of advance notice of plant 
closings on local area unemployment rates and labor force size. They examine the effects of 
major plant closings (those involving more than 100 workers) in Maine for a period prior to 
advance notice becoming mandatory in the state. They identify 107 such major plant closings 
between 1971 and 1981.  A total of 21,225 workers were directly affected, and a multiplier of 2.3 
meant that 49,219 Maine workers felt an impact.  The authors find that voluntary provision by a 
firm of at least one month’s advance notice to displaced workers significantly diminishes the 
closing’s impact on the local area unemployment rate in the month of closing.  
Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988, p. 75–76) find that receiving advance notice appears to 
reduce the probability that a displaced worker will suffer any spell of unemployment, but that it 
has no effect on the individual’s duration of nonemployment if he or she becomes unemployed, 
or on the individual’s earnings if he or she finds reemployment.  Their work is based on the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 1984 Displaced Worker Survey.  They say that “contrary to 
concerns expressed by critics of advance notice, we also find no evidence that advance notice 
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leads a firm’s most productive workers to quit prior to their planned displacement date, thereby 
disrupting a firm’s operations in its final weeks” (Ehrenberg and Jakubson, p. v). 
Labor Supply Enhancing Policies 
Job Search Assistance and the UI work test  
Job Search Assistance (JSA) comprises a bundle of services available from the public 
labor exchange which may include the following: resume preparation assistance, job finding 
clubs, provision of specific labor market information, development of a job search plan, and 
orientation to self-service resources (job vacancy listings, resume preparation, word processor 
competency testing, telephones for contacting employers).  In the evaluations of JSA that have 
been done, job search workshops (JSW) are treated as a distinct service.  A summary of 
evaluations on job search assistance and the work test is given in Table 1.   
Three specific evaluations of JSA done in the past 20 years have been particularly 
influential in shaping public labor exchange policy.  All three evaluations were done as field 
experiments involving random assignment.  Among other offerings of the public employment 
service, job referrals and placements have not applied an experimental design because of the 
untenable design requirement of withholding from the control group basic services having 
universal entitlement. Consequently, JSA evaluations have focused on UI claimants and have 
usually involved providing additional services.   
It is well documented that in performing its income replacement function, UI acts as a 
disincentive to rapid return to work (Decker 1997).  The work test that links the UI and ES 





beneficiaries are available and actively seeking work.  The JSA evaluations have investigated 
various approaches to improving the effectiveness of the work test for UI.   
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment.  The first field 
experiment addressing aspects of the UI work test in the United States began enrollment in 
February 1983 in Charleston, South Carolina.  Random assignment of 5,675 new initial UI 









     
Employment Service (ES) referrals −2.10 Washington Jacobson & Petta (2000) 
ES referrals −1.10 Oregon Jacobson & Petta (2000) 
    
Stronger work test −0.55 Charleston, SC Corson et al.(1985) 
Stronger work test plus placement −0.61 Charleston, SC Corson et al.(1985) 
Stronger work test plus placement and JSW −0.76 Charleston, SC Corson et al.(1985) 
    
Report 4 employer contacts −0.70 Maryland Klepinger et al. (1998) 
Make 2 employer contacts but no reporting 0.40 Maryland Klepinger et al. (1998) 
Make 2 employer contacts plus JSW −0.60 Maryland Klepinger et al. (1998) 
Make 2 employer contacts, both verified −0.90 Maryland Klepinger et al. (1998) 
    
Remove the work test 3.30 Tacoma, WA Johnson & Klepinger (1994) 
Remove the work test 5.28 Northern Ireland McVicar (2008) 
     
Job search assistance (JSA) −0.47 New Jersey Corson et al. (1989) 
JSA plus training −0.48 New Jersey Corson et al. (1989) 
JSA plus reemployment bonus −0.97 New Jersey Corson et al. (1989) 
    
Structured job search −1.13 DC Decker et al. (2000) 
Individual job search −0.47 DC Decker et al. (2000) 
Individual job search plus training −0.61 DC Decker et al. (2000) 
    
Structured job search −0.41 Florida Decker et al. (2000) 
Individual job search −0.59 Florida Decker et al. (2000) 
Individual job search plus training −0.52 Florida Decker et al. (2000) 
    
WPRS profiled and referred to services     
    Connecticut −0.25     Connecticut Dickinson et al. (1999) 
    Illinois −0.41     Illinois Dickinson et al. (1999) 
    Kentucky −0.21     Kentucky Dickinson et al. (1999) 
    Kentucky −2.20     Kentucky Black et al. (2003) 
    New Jersey −0.29     New Jersey Dickinson et al. (1999) 
    Maine −0.98     Maine Dickinson et al. (1999) 
NOTE: JSW means job search workshop.  WPRS means Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services.   
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claimants to three treatment groups and a control group was completed in December 1983.  The 
experiment was designed to evaluate new procedures intended to improve the UI work test and 
enhance ES practices.  The three treatments tested represented successively larger bundles of 
services.  This design permitted researchers to contrast the treatments against each other as well 
as against the single control group.   
Claimants assigned to the control group were given the customary work test, which 
involved informing claimants that ES registration was required but involved no systematic 
monitoring of this requirement.  The three treatments in Charleston were as follows: 
1. A strengthened work test, requiring that an ES registration notice be sent after the 
first UI benefit check was paid.  Payment of the second check would be 
suspended for failure to register with the ES.  This required establishment of 
improved data-sharing systems between UI and ES. 
 
2. A strengthened work test, plus enhanced placement services.  These services 
included a personal placement interview within one week of the first UI check, a 
job referral or an outreach attempt to contact a prospective employer (job 
development), and training in using the job vacancy listings.  Treatment-assigned 
claimants were also told they would be called for special services again once they 
drew nine weeks of benefits.   
 
3. A strengthened work test, enhanced placement services, plus job search 
workshops.  The workshops included a three-hour JSW and, after four weeks of 
UI benefits, a JSW on labor market information. 
 
The strengthened work test had the greatest impact.  By itself, it shortened the duration of 
compensated joblessness by more than half a week; the impact estimate was −0.55 weeks of UI 
benefits.  This effect was statistically significant, but not significantly different from the 
estimated effect of the second treatment:  the addition of enhanced placement services resulted in 
an impact estimate of −0.61 weeks, or an insignificant increase over the strengthened work test 
alone.  The impact estimate for the third treatment, which added JSWs, was −0.76 weeks of UI 
benefits, a modest incremental effect over either of the other treatments.   
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Impacts of the treatments were concentrated among men (who averaged impacts of 
greater than −1.0 weeks for all treatments) and among workers in the construction industry (who 
had impacts of over −4.0 weeks).  The relatively low cost of treatments resulted in jaw-dropping 
benefit-cost ratios in excess of 4.  That is, more than four dollars in UI benefit payments were 
saved for every dollar spent on the work test, JSA, and JSW services.  The third treatment, which 
involved the largest number of components, had an average cost of only $17.58 in 1983 dollars.   
In 1969 the UI trust fund was added to the federal unified budget.  Conservation of UI 
funds consequently improves the overall budget picture.  In the 1980s’ political environment of 
huge federal deficits, the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment drew 
attention to the strengthened work test, JSA, and JSW as appealing policy tools.  These 
instruments offered the potential of providing positive services while conserving UI trust fund 
dollars. 
Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment.  Effects of the UI work test and 
related services of the public labor exchange were further investigated by a field experiment 
using random assignment that was conducted between July 1986 and August 1987 at several 
Tacoma, Washington, job service centers.  A total of 6,763 UI claimants were assigned to one of 
three treatments, and 2,871 claimants were assigned to the control group, which followed the 
existing Washington state work search policy.   
The standard work search rule required three employer contacts per week, plus an 
eligibility review interview (ERI) 13 to 15 weeks after the initial claim was filed.  This ERI 
involved a one-hour group session followed by a 15-minute individual interview.  The focus of 
both sessions was on UI eligibility.  The three treatments in Tacoma were as follows: 
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1. Exception reporting.  This was a complete relaxation of the work test.  Claimants 
were not required to file the standard biweekly continued UI claim form and were 
told that UI payments would continue until the claimant reported a change in 
circumstances, such as a return to work or an increased level of earnings.  
 
2. New work search policy.  This treatment had individualized work search 
requirements, including a group ERI followed by an intensive one-on-one follow-
up interview.   
 
3. Intensive services.  This contained Treatment 2’s individualized work search 
requirements, plus the following services:  a two-day JSW after four weeks (two 
days of classroom instruction plus 10 hours of phone canvassing); a group ERI 
after 12 weeks, with a focus on employability development; and individual 
follow-up.   
 
Suspension of enrollment into the first treatment was done earlier than planned because 
the larger-than-expected response could easily be detected with a sample much smaller than 
designed.  Claimants relieved of the work test and continued claim filing increased their weeks 
of UI benefits drawn by a statistically significant 3.34 weeks.  This impact was bigger for women 
with children and men without children, and for married women and unmarried men.  
The new work search policy which provided custom-tailored services and schedules, had 
an effect on UI benefit receipt of +0.17 weeks and was statistically indistinguishable from the 
existing standard work search rule applied uniformly to all claimants.   
Treatment 3, which was customized and had a JSW after four weeks and an ERI after 12 
weeks, had a statistically significant impact of −0.47 weeks.  Impacts were bigger for women 
without children and unmarried women.  An analysis of the timing of the components of this 
treatment and claimant response (at 4 and 12 weeks), combined with analysis of the timing of the 
standard treatment given the control group (at 13 to 15 weeks) and the response to that standard 
treatment, provided new insight into claimant behavior.  In both cases, researchers observed 
suspension of UI benefit receipt to be more common immediately before a scheduled 
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intervention rather than after the service was provided.  Such a response might be termed an 
“invitation effect.”   
This led to the conclusion that the timed elements of the work test—JSW and ERI—acted 
more like a stick prodding return to work than a carrot providing nourishment for achieving that 
end.  The researchers speculated that the response to Treatment 2 had no identifiable peaks in the 
timing of exit from UI receipt because the individually customized schedule attenuated the 
observed response to an ERI invitation.   
Needless to say, exception reporting was estimated to be very costly.  Individualized 
requirements generated no differential impact.  An invitation to attend either an ERI or a JSW 
shortens duration, with the latter having a bigger effect.  Exit rates are lower during and after the 
ERI and the JSW, suggesting it is the requirement to attend rather than the value of the session 
that shortens duration.    
Maryland UI Work Search Experiment.  Enrollment in the Maryland UI work search 
experiment was conducted in six public labor exchange offices around the state throughout the 
calendar year of 1994.  A combined sample of 23,758 new monetarily eligible UI claimants were 
enrolled in the experiment.  
The standard work search policy was given to the control group.  This required two job 
search contacts per week, which had to be reported on the biweekly UI continued claim form but 
were not verified.  The four alternative treatments tested made these directives to claimants: 
1. Report four weekly employer contacts, which will not be not verified. 
 
2. Contact two employers per week.  Beneficiaries need not report the two 
contacted. 
 
3. Report two weekly employer contacts, which will not be verified, plus attend a 




4. Report two weekly employer contacts.  Beneficiaries are told their employer 
contacts will be verified.  
 
Requiring four employer contacts per week yielded a statistically significant impact of 
−0.7 weeks of UI benefits.  This reduction in duration resulted even in the absence of any 
verification of the offers.  Requiring two employer contacts per week, but removing the 
requirement to report the two contacts, resulted in a statistically significant increase in UI benefit 
durations of +0.4 weeks.  The impact of requiring two employer contacts per week, which were 
not verified, plus attendance at a four-day JSW early in the unemployment spell was −0.6 weeks 
of UI.  Like the Tacoma experiment, this impact was due to increasing the amount of hassle 
associated with staying on UI, not to increasing claimants’ job search skills.  Notably for 
employers, this third treatment also reduced the probability of a claimant’s returning to his or her 
prior employer.   
Requiring two employer contacts to be reported, plus telling claimants that their two 
contacts would be verified, impacted UI benefits by −0.9 weeks.  The verification rate of 10 
percent appeared to be an adequate threat.  Notably, the impact of this fourth treatment occurred 
during the first spell of joblessness.  Similarly, the first treatment generated the bulk of its 
response during the first spell of joblessness in the benefit year.  
The effects of Treatments 1, 3, and 4 were not associated with lower reemployment 
earnings.  However, eliminating the work search reporting requirement, as in Treatment 2, raised 
reemployment earnings by a statistically significant 4 percent.   
A second control group facing the standard work test was also tracked, but claimants 
assigned to this group were told that their behavior was being tracked as part of an experiment.  
This was done to permit testing for the presence of a Hawthorne effect.  This is relevant in 
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ensuring external validity of the evaluation.  If part of the treatment response to a new work test 
is simply due to placing added attention on the work test, then such an effect could quickly 
dissipate after actual implementation.  Impact estimates computed as a contrast between the 
participant group and each of the two control groups were virtually identical, suggesting the 
absence of any Hawthorne effect. 
JSA in the UK.  Results from some of the experimental evaluations raised questions 
about whether shorter UI durations were observed because of the positive value of the content of 
JSA, or simply because beneficiaries ended UI receipt to avoid the hassle of JSA.  Some insight 
into this question can be had from the experience in the United Kingdom (UK), where 
unemployment compensation (UC) is administered by the public employment service and has a 
uniform initial entitled duration of 12 months.  In 1987, a new program called “Restart” was 
introduced nationally.  Under Restart, UC beneficiaries nearing six continuous months of benefit 
receipt were called in for an appointment at their local ES office and were provided with an 
intensive package of JSA.   
An evaluation of the UK’s Restart program by Dolton and O’Neill (1996) estimated 
short-term effects similar to those observed by Johnson and Klepinger (1994) in the Tacoma 
alternative work search experiment.  Both evaluations suggested a modest shortening in the 
duration of compensated unemployment and concluded that the invitation for intensive JSA 
acted more as a prod than a support for reemployment.  
Dolton and O’Neill (2002) conducted a subsequent random-assignment field experiment 
in which the treatment group received the standard Restart services when nearing six continuous 
months on claim, while the randomly selected control group was given the Restart services after 
approaching 12 continuous months of receiving UC benefits.  They found evidence that, over the 
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short term, required JSA might appear to act like a stick, prodding UC beneficiaries to go back to 
work, but over the long term an earlier JSA intervention supported higher success in the labor 
market and higher earnings—evidence that JSA can have valuable content for job seekers.   
Targeted Job Search Assistance 
Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during the 1990s, following the massive 
economic restructuring and worker dislocation of the previous decade.  Earlier research had 
identified JSA as a cost-effective tool for promoting return to work.  The question of whether 
JSA would be effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment was evaluated in the context 
of a major field experiment in New Jersey (Corson et al. 1989).  Together with earlier evidence 
on JSA cost-effectiveness, results from the New Jersey experiment supported establishment of 
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, which required targeted JSA 
(Wandner 1994).   
Two subsequent experiments have evaluated the effectiveness of targeted JSA.  The first 
was undertaken around the time of WPRS start-up, with special accommodations made to ensure 
experimental integrity (Decker et al. 2000).  The second evaluation was done using data from 
after WPRS implementation (Black et al. 2003).  In this section, we briefly review the design and 
findings of these studies.  
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment.  Enrollment into the New Jersey UI 
Reemployment Experiment was done between July 1986 and June 1987 (Corson et al. 1989).  
The sampling frame for random assignment was set to target the evaluation to dislocated workers 
claiming UI benefits.  Characteristics screens were set to construct the sampling frame.   
These screens required that a claimant meet five conditions.  The claimant 1) must 
receive a first UI payment, and that payment must occur within five weeks of applying for 
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benefits; 2) must be at least 25 years of age; 3) must have worked for the pre-UI claim employer 
for at least three years; 4) may not be on standby awaiting return to the claimant’s previous job 
with a specific recall date; and 5) may not be a union hiring hall member.   
The first three of these eligibility conditions permitted the offer of an intervention early in 
the jobless spell; and of these three, the second and third ensured that subjects of the experiment 
were well established labor force members separated from a long job attachment.  The fourth and 
fifth conditions provided the potential for interventions to affect job search plans.  Claimants 
who are awaiting recall to their prior job and members of union hiring halls are not required by 
the UI system to engage in active job search.  
Random assignment sent 2,385 claimants to the control group and 8,675 to one of three 
treatment groups.  All three treatments included JSA, the first being JSA alone.  The second 
treatment added job training to JSA.12  The third treatment added a cash reemployment bonus to 
JSA.  The bonus was for reemployment within 11 weeks of the claim and was a cash payment of 
half the remaining UI entitlement, with the initial offer good for two weeks and then declining by 
10 percent per week.  The bonus was not paid if return to work was a recall, or if the job was 
temporary, seasonal, part time, or with a relative.  For all three treatments, at five weeks into the 
claim, all claimants were given JSA orientation, skills and aptitude testing, a JSA workshop, and 
an assessment or counseling interview. 
During the benefit year, the impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt were −0.47, −0.48, 
and −0.97 for the three treatments, respectively.  All of these impacts were estimated to have 
statistical significance.  The cumulative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt over the six years 
after the initial benefit claim were −0.76, −0.93, and −1.72 for the three treatments, respectively, 
                                                          
12 A relocation allowance was also available in Treatment 2, but it was rarely used.   
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with the impact from the third treatment estimated to have statistical significance (Corson and 
Haimson 1996).   
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated that JSA targeted to 
claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had the same cost-effective impact as that found for 
other groups of UI claimants—about half a week shorter UI receipt.  The encouraging results for 
the bonus treatment led the U.S. Department of Labor to further investigate the ideal design for a 
reemployment bonus offer (Decker and O’Leary 1995).   
Job Search Assistance Experiment.  The Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
Act of 1991 authorized the U.S. Department of Labor to conduct the Job Search Assistance 
Experiment.  The experiment was designed to evaluate whether providing early JSA to claimants 
identified by statistical models as being likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement would be 
cost-effective (Decker et al. 2000).  During the planning stages of the evaluation, which was 
scheduled to be run in the District of Columbia and the state of Florida, federal legislation 
leapfrogged public policy analysis. 
In 1993 President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which required state employment 
security agencies to establish and use a system of profiling all new claimants for regular UI 
benefits.  The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was intended to 
identify UI claimants who were most likely to exhaust their regular benefits, so that they might 
be provided with early reemployment services to make a faster transition to new employment.   
The WPRS established a two-stage process.  First, UI recipients who are expecting recall 
or who are members of a union hall are dropped.  These groups are excluded because they are 
not expected to undertake an active independent job search.  Second, remaining UI recipients are 
ranked by their likelihood of exhausting regular unemployment insurance benefits.  Beneficiaries 
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are then referred to early reemployment services in order of their ranking until the capacity of 
local agencies to serve them is exhausted.  The early assistance comprises at least eight hours of 
job search assistance, which usually includes an orientation to self-help facilities available at the 
public labor exchange and a JSW. 
The JSA experiment proceeded with enrollment in Florida between March 1995 and 
March 1996 at 10 sites around the state where regular WPRS operations were temporarily 
delayed.  Random assignment in Florida involved 8,071 claimants.  In Washington, D.C., the 
experiment counted as the federal district’s WPRS implementation.  Random assignment 
enrollment for the JSA experiment was done in all public labor exchange offices throughout the 
District between June 1995 and June 1996 and involved 12,042 claimants.     
The JSA experiment established an eligible pool of claimants using a two-stage process: 
1) exclude job-attached and union hiring hall members, then 2) evaluate claimants’ probability of 
exhausting UI entitlement and target those with highest probabilities for the evaluation.  These 
claimants were randomly assigned to a control group or one of three treatments.  The treatments 
were as follows: 
1. Structured job search assistance (SJSA): orientation, testing, JSW, and one-on-
one assessment interview.  Failure to participate could result in denial of UI 
benefits.  Two additional visits with staff to report job search progress. 
 
2. Individualized job search assistance (IJSA): orientation and one-on-one 
assessment interview.  Individual plan developed, which may include additional 
mandatory services. 
 
3. Individualized job search assistance with training (IJSA+): identical to IJSA, plus 
a coordinated effort with EDWAA staff to enroll the customer in training.  
 
The impacts of the three treatments on weeks of UI compensation in the benefit year in 
Washington, DC, were −1.13, −0.47, and −0.61 respectively, all estimated to have statistical 
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significance.  Estimates of the same parameters in Florida were −0.41, −0.59, and −0.52, all of 
which, again, were statistically significant.  Both evaluations indicated that reemployment 
occurred at wage rates similar to prior levels.  The treatments had generally positive and 
significant effects on earnings in Washington, DC, but no impact on participant earnings in 
Florida. 
Structured JSA emerged as the most cost-effective intervention examined.  The authors 
of the evaluation report attributed the generally larger impacts observed in Washington, DC, to 
stricter enforcement of JSA participation requirements.  They recommend making particular JSA 
services mandatory and maintaining clear linkages between UI and ES in the new one-stop 
environment under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). 
Evaluation of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services in Kentucky.  While 
Kentucky was included among the states studied in the national evaluation of WPRS, an 
independent assessment of WPRS in Kentucky based on an experimental design arrived at a 
much different conclusion.  The profiling model used in Kentucky was developed by economists 
at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the University of Kentucky (Berger et al. 
1997).  In working with the Kentucky Department for Employment Services on the WPRS 
system, they advocated a methodology for assignment to WPRS which provided ready data for 
an experimental evaluation of WPRS effectiveness. 
Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution into 20 groups spanning 5 
percentile points each.  Every week the local WPRS capacity is hit within one of the 20 groups.  
That group is referred to as a profiling tie group (PTG).  In Kentucky, profiled WPRS customers 
within PTGs are randomly assigned to WPRS, or not.  This is viewed as an appropriate rule for 
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referral to WPRS from a group of UI claimants having scores that are not statistically 
significantly different.  It also provides the basis for evaluation of WPRS based on random trials.   
From the PTGs, experimental and control groups were formed by the random trials to 
conduct an evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky (Black et al. 2001).  Data was collected starting 
with the very beginning of WPRS implementation in Kentucky, in October 1994, and lasting 
through June 1996.  The PTGs yielded a total sample of 1,981 claimants, and 1,236 of these were 
assigned to mandatory WPRS JSA.  Compared to the total population of 48,002 profiled and 
referred Kentucky claimants during that period, means of observable characteristics (age, 
schooling, gender, race, prior earnings, weekly benefit amount) for the experimental treatment 
group were not statistically significantly different from those in the control group.   
The impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky were dramatic.  On three outcomes of 
interest, the estimated impacts were −2.2 weeks of UI, −$143 in UI benefits, and a $1,054 
increase in earnings during the UI benefit year.  The difference in these estimates from the 
national WPRS evaluation were most likely due to the fact that Black et al. (2003) essentially 
confined their contrasts within PTGs, thereby achieving a closer counterfactual.  Dickinson et al. 
(1999, 2002) compared those assigned to WPRS who had the highest probability of benefit 
exhaustion against all those profiled but not referred, including many with very low exhaustion 
probabilities.  This meant the comparison group in the national evaluation was likely to have a 
shorter mean benefit duration than program participants even in the absence of WPRS services.   
The extraordinary foresight of the Kentucy Department of Employment Services to 
include randomization in assignment to WPRS should be a model for all state and local 
employment service delivery agencies.  In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Kentucky 
agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that orientation to help resolve the 
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resource allocation problem.  When resources are limited, randomization in program assignment 
can always be viewed as an equitable mechanism.  It has the added benefit of providing for very 
strong evaluation evidence. 
Job training for displaced workers 
A number of researchers have summarized the literature on publicly funded training, 
producing syntheses of what we do (and don’t) know, focusing mainly on experimental 
evaluations of training for several groups that have been the object of attention in federal and 
state efforts for decades: disadvantaged adults and youth; dislocated workers; and welfare 
recipients.  This paper draws upon earlier syntheses and distills findings from recently completed 
experimental and quasiexperimental evaluations.  It stresses per-participant earnings impacts as 
the primary outcome of interest.  Impacts and associated costs have been converted into constant 
2001 dollars.   
The rationale for relying mainly on experimental evaluations is that, despite recent 
enhancements in quasiexperimental methods for evaluating training (e.g., Heckman et al. 1999 
and Hollenbeck et al. 2005), the best evidence comes from well designed and structured 
experiments relying on randomly assigned treatment and control groups.  This was recognized by 
the 1985 Job Training Longitudinal Survey Research Advisory Committee (1985), which 
recommended that the U.S. Department of Labor redirect its resources to conducting 
experimental training evaluations.  This recommendation resulted in the National JTPA Study, 
which ran from 1985–1993 (Bloom et al. 1994; Orr et al. 1996).  Barnow (1987); Fraker and 




Presentation of per-participant or per-enrollee rather than per-assignee impacts is a matter 
of discussion among evaluation researchers.  Despite the use of random assignment to treatment 
or control status, not all of those assigned to a given treatment—e.g., classroom training or 
OJT/Job Search Assistance (JSA) in the National JTPA Study—actually received it.  Per-
assignee impacts are lower than per-participant or per-enrollee ones.  Results presented here are 
per-participant impacts, emphasizing earnings impacts for those actually receiving services 
rather than those merely assigned to them. 
A final issue to be addressed is the basis for comparison, termed the counterfactual.  In 
many training evaluations, the standard counterfactual has been a no-services control group.  In 
fact, the more realistic basis for comparison is one where control group members may receive 
whatever education, employment, and training services are generally available to the community, 
just not those specifically funded by the program being evaluated.  This is the stance adopted for 
the National JTPA Study, the Job Corps evaluation, and other major evaluations conducted since 
the mid-1980s.  What is being estimated is the incremental impact of training over and above the 
effects of services that are readily available in the community.13  
Duane Leigh (1989, 1990, 1995) reviewed what we know about job training for 
dislocated workers, the various programs and approaches that have been developed since the 
early 1960s to assist them, and their effects.  Unfortunately, experimental evaluations of 
dislocated worker programs have been the exception, so our understanding of their impacts is 
limited.  Only two have been conducted to date:  the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration 
                                                          
13 Kane and Rouse (1999, p. 74) suggest that researchers have been far too conservative in interpreting 
JTPA training impacts, a point also made in the recent paper by Barnow and Gubits (2002).   
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(1984-87)14 and the New Jersey Reemployment Demonstration (1986–1987).  The dearth of 
experimental evaluations for dislocated worker services probably stems in part from the nature of 
the programs themselves: they are often viewed as “emergency” or “rapid” responses to 
immediate crises in communities rather than ongoing efforts to address industrial or labor market 
shifts.   
The Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration tested a two-tiered service model for 
dislocated workers in Houston and El Paso in the mid-1980s (Bloom 1990).  Tier I services 
consisted basically of job search assistance, while Tier II—which could only be reached 
subsequent to participation in Tier I—consisted of occupational skills training.  In essence, the 
Texas demonstration sought to test an early version of “work-first-plus” for dislocated workers.  
More than 2,200 workers were randomly assigned to Tier I, Tier I/II, and control group statuses 
across all sites.  UI wage records and survey-based data provided information on their outcomes.  
Key impact results included the following: 
$ Earnings impacts for displaced women were substantial and sustained over the 
one-year follow-up period, although these diminished over time.  In 2001 dollars, 
women participants earned approximately $1,890 (34 percent) more because of 
their participation. 
 
$ Impacts for males were smaller and shorter-lived, producing gains of only $1,108 
in 2001 dollars (8 percent).  
 
$ No additional gains were found for adding Tier II services to Tier I job search (p. 
137); however, problems with implementing the design may well have precluded 
such impacts.15 
 
                                                          
14 The author served as assistant director of research, demonstration and evaluation for the Texas JTPA 
program during this period and expended considerable effort to ensure that an experimental design was the basis for 
the Texas demonstration.  An Abt Associates team led by Howard Bloom, then at New York University, conducted 
the evaluation.  
15 Most of the Tier II referrals to training were in the Houston site, and, unfortunately, many of these were 
referrals of former white-collar professionals to what was seen as blue-collar training.  A more appropriate test of 
this Tier I/II design would have been desirable.  
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$ The New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration in the mid-1980s sought to test 
whether the UI system could be used to identify and serve UI-eligible dislocated 
workers early in their unemployment spells to accelerate their return to work.  
Some 8,675 UI claimants were randomly assigned to three service packages for 
the demonstration: 1) JSA only, 2) JSA combined with training (some enrollees) 
or relocation assistance (very few), and 3) and JSA combined with a cash 
reemployment bonus.  Incremental impacts were computed relative to outcomes 
for UI claimants receiving regularly available services.  Mathematica Policy 
Research conducted the evaluation.  Corson and Haimson (1995) found the 
following: 
 
 None of the treatments had any long-term impacts on employment, 
earnings, or weeks worked when measured up to six years after random 
assignment. 
 
 While all three treatments had positive impacts, the JSA combined with 
the reemployment bonus was the only service strategy that led to 
statistically significant, initial increases in earnings, and these increases 
were modest and very short-lived—i.e., for just the first quarter.   
 Training—in which relatively few workers participated—had no added 
impact on earnings in either the near- or longer-term, although this may 
have been an artifact of the small numbers enrolled.  Reanalysis of 
earnings impacts for those actually enrolled in training indicated that 
participation in training—CT and OJT—did appear to enhance participant 
earnings.16 
 
To date, we have not fully tested the impact of skills training or retraining for dislocated 
workers with a solidly implemented demonstration evaluated with an experimental design.  
Recent analyses by Jacobsen et al. (2001, 2002) using Washington State administrative data 
suggest that the returns to community college education for dislocated workers are significant 
and may endure for several years.  However, their estimates of the returns to education and 
training are derived from statistical comparisons of “observationally similar” groups of displaced 
                                                          
16 Estimated earnings effects for training participation are very high: for example, second-year, per-enrollee 
impacts of $1,402 (insignificant) for CT and $10,987 for OJT (significant at the 99 percent level) in 1986-1987 
dollars (see Corson and Haimson 1995, p. 48).  Note that these estimates are based on very small numbers and are 
not true experimental impact estimates.  Only 15 percent of those referred to training received it, while 19 percent of 
those offered the reemployment bonus received it (pp. 18-19). 
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workers (Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2002, p. 203) and lack the precision of most quasi-
experimental estimates.   
The quasi-experimental analysis conducted by Hollenbeck et al. (2005) in seven states 
found that dislocated workers being served in WIA experienced statistically significant 
incremental impacts, as follows: 
$ Dislocated workers receiving training services gained just $386 per quarter. 
 
$ Male dislocated workers gained $357 per quarter, while female dislocated 
workers gained $422 per quarter from WIA training services. 
 
Although WIA has been in place for more than a decade, there has never been a rigorous 
evaluation of its effectiveness using a field experiment involving random assignment.  Congress, 
on the other hand, required that WIA’s predecessor—the Job Training and Partnership Act—be 
evaluated using the random assignment approach.17  Therefore, most of what we know about the 
effects of job training programs is from that JTPA evaluation.  However, Upjohn Institute staff 
and others have conducted evaluations of WIA for a few states using nonexperimental 
econometric methods yielding results that are generally consistent with the JTPA field 
experiment estimates.  
The quasi-experimental econometric evaluations of WIA training have been done in a 
few states using program administrative and wage record data.  The results from these studies as 
presented in Table 2 have been standardized by Hollenbeck (2009) to constant 2008 dollars.  To 
create comparison groups for training participants, all of these studies used the nonexperimental 
                                                          
17 The field experiment methodology creates a comparison group by randomly assigning individuals to 
either a treatment group or a control group.  Individuals in the treatment group receive training, and those in the 
control group do not.  As the assignment is random and with a large enough sample, the average characteristics of 
persons in the two groups should be similar in terms of observable factors such as demographics as well as 
unobservable attributes such as motivation for employment.  In principle this approach eliminates selection bias.  
Therefore, examining differences across treatment and control groups in the means of worker outcomes, such as 
employment and retention rates, yields net impacts of training.   
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approach of statistical matching on scores of the propensity to participate in training.  Net 
impacts of training were then determined by comparing outcomes for individuals who 
participated in the training programs to their matched counterparts who registered for job search 
with the ES but were not recorded as participating in any specific service.  With the exception of 
reemployment rates in Indiana, the results are consistent across the studies and across the states.  
The evidence suggests that job training for displaced workers under WIA is effective, especially 
in increasing employment rates, but also in generating higher earnings.  
Based on the experimental evaluation under JTPA, job training yielded positive but 
modest effects on employment and earnings.  The effects varied by gender, economic and labor 
market status, and the way in which training services were delivered. Women appeared to 
respond more favorably to training than men:  earnings gains after 30 months from leaving the 
training program were nearly 7 percentage points higher for women than men.  Adult women on 
welfare benefited even more.  The same advantage was found for young women, although the 
results are not statistically significant.   
 
Table 2.  Summary of Estimates of Training Effects from Nonexperimental Evaluations of WIA Job 
Training   





    
Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) Washington 6.7** 354** 
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) 7 States 5.9** 483** 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) Washington 4.2** 391** 
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) 12 States 1.4 –$36 
Hollenbeck (2009a) Indiana 15.9** 394** 
NOTE:  Quarterly earnings are in 2008 dollars. ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level in a two-tailed test. . 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2003)—Area:  WA; Treatment:  exit in 1997/1998; Follow-up period:  8 to 11 quarters after exit. 
Hollenbeck, Schroeder, King, and Huang (2005)—Area:  7 states; Treatment: exit in 2000/2002; Follow-up period: 2 to7 
quarters after exit.  
Hollenbeck and Huang (2006)—Area:  WA; Treatment: exit in 2001/2002; Follow-up period: 9 to 12 quarters after exit. 
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008)—Area:  12 states; Treatment:  entry in 2003/2005; Follow-up period: 11 to 14 
quarters after entry. 
Hollenbeck (2009a)—Area:  IN; Treatment: exit in 2005/2006; Follow-up period:  7 quarters after exit. 





Curiously, adult men and women fared better in on-the-job training under JTPA, whereas 
young men and women responded more favorably to classroom training, although the results for 
youth were not statistically significant.  Finally, even though adult women had higher earnings 
gains than adult men, the net benefits to society for men and women were about the same.  
Programs with only classroom training did not generally have statistically significant results, 
except for women, and when classroom training was strongly linked to employers.   
Labor Demand Policies   
Three noteworthy field experiments to induce hiring or job creation by employers are 
summarized in this section: 1) the Dayton wage subsidy experiment, 2) the Illinois UI employer 
incentive experiment, and 3) the Washington and Massachusetts UI self-employment 
experiments.  
Self-employment 
Self-employment initiatives for unemployed persons have been operating in Europe since 
1979.18  Seventeen countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have programs patterned after either the French model, which grants a 
lump sum to the unemployed who plan to become self-employed, or the British model, which 
gives a series of periodic support payments during the start-up phase of self-employment.19  The 
British model amounts to a waiver of the work search requirements for continued receipt of 
                                                          
18 Background information on the European experience with self-employment assistance and the American 
experiments in self-employment for unemployed persons can be found in Wandner (1992). 
19 The French model is followed in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, while the British 




periodic unemployment compensation payments.  American experiments recently tested the 
French model in Washington State and the British model in Massachusetts. 
Wage subsidies and supplements 
In standard usage, a wage subsidy is a payment directly to an employer to partially offset 
the wage costs for a newly hired employee, while a wage supplement means a payment directly 
to a worker.  There is much less evidence about the latter, but results from the wage subsidy 
suggest a supplement may be more effective.  The main appeal of the wage supplement is that it 
is unlikely to create the type of stigma that employers may attribute to workers for whom they 
receive wage subsidies.  The importance of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) may be largely 
due to the fact that it is paid directly to working families without any employer knowledge. 
Among the four tests of wage subsidies in the United States, two operated as government 
programs run through the tax system and two worked as voucher experiments.  During the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit 
(TJTC) allowed employers to reduce tax payments by a fraction of the amount paid to workers 
hired under the programs.  Hamermesh and Rees (1984, p. 99) report that NJTC subsidies were 
drawn for one-third of all the new jobs created during the period it was in effect.  However, 
Perloff and Wachter (1979) estimate that the NJTC resulted in just 3 percent more jobs than 
would have been created without the program.  The TJTC was intended to increase employment 
among certain targeted disadvantaged groups.  Hollenbeck and Wilke (1991) found that the 
TJTC increased labor market success of “nonwhite male youth, but is stigmatizing for eligible 
individuals from other race/sex groups.”  This finding that a wage subsidy acts as a stigma also 
emerged from the experimental studies.  
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Dayton Wage Subsidy Experiment.  A targeted wage subsidy was operated as a field 
experiment with random trials in 1980–1981 by the U.S. Department of Labor in Dayton, Ohio.  
Burtless (1985) reported that “the results show conclusively that workers known to be eligible 
for targeted wage subsidies were significantly less likely to find jobs than were otherwise 
identical workers whose eligibility for subsidies was not advertised” (p. 106). Burtless 
“speculates that the vouchers had a stigmatizing effect and provided a screening device with 
which employers discriminated against economically disadvantaged workers” (p. 105).   
Illinois Unemployment Insurance Incentive Program.  Another experiment testing an 
intervention that amounted to a wage subsidy was not restricted to economically disadvantaged 
workers but may have also stigmatized job seekers.  Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) report 
that for the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment, cash bonuses paid directly to persons who 
gain reemployment have a powerful effect in reducing the duration of unemployment, while if a 
cash payment for hiring a job seeker is made to employers the effect is almost nil.  Employers 
may be reluctant to hire workers who present a voucher for payment from the state because it 
signals that the worker may have "hidden" characteristics which hinder their finding employment 
without a state subsidy. 
Most programs for the unemployed are either income-support or labor-supply enhancing; 
the wage subsidy is a labor demand stimulus.  But apparently regardless of the form of delivery 
of the subsidy to employers, it has a stigmatizing effect on workers.  An obvious alternative is 
the wage supplement, which is paid directly to workers.  This type of program has even been 
recommended to help welfare recipients, who may face the most severe stigma, gain 
reemployment.20 
                                                          
20 See for example Lerman (1985). 
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Minnesota Emergency Employment Development (MEED) Program.  The Minnesota 
Emergency Employment Development program, known by its acronym, MEED, was in place 
from 1983 to 1989 (Minnesota Job Training Office 1988).  About 45,000 people enrolled in the 
program, which provided a wage subsidy of up to $4 per hour (about $10 in 2008 dollars) for 
employers to hire new workers, many of whom were low-skilled or among the long-term 
unemployed.  Following their MEED experience, more than 20,000 of those workers succeeded 
in staying on with their employers or finding other permanent, unsubsidized employment, 
according to a report by the Corporation for Enterprise Development. 
Over the 30-month period from July 1, 1983, to December 31, 1985, 30,547 people 
enrolled in MEED. Of these, 11,537 were eligible for or were receiving cash public assistance 
welfare payments.  Wage subsidies of up to $4 per hour for wages plus up to $1 per hour for 
fringe benefits were paid to employers hiring unemployed workers in Minnesota.  Among all 
enrollees, 60 percent were hired by private-sector businesses.   Over the program’s final six 
months, from July 1 to December 31, 1985, all MEED-subsidized hiring was done by private 
sector businesses.  Of these hirees, 80 percent were retained by their employers for at least 60 
days after the six-month wage subsidy period ended.  Among all those hired, the average wage 
was $5.07 per hour, and for those hired by private-sector firms the average wage was $5.15.  Of 
the 30,547 participants, 49 percent were in permanent unsubsidized jobs after the MEED subsidy 
ended.  Of the 8,044 enrollees overall who were placed in private-sector firms, 83 percent were 
still working in unsubsidized jobs 60 days after subsidies ended.    
Objective assessments of MEED have been much more favorable than such assessments 
were for earlier wage subsidy experiments.  These evaluations have viewed MEED from an 
economic development perspective.  State job creation efforts frequently cost more than $50,000 
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(and sometimes even up to $100,000) per new job created when attracting new employers.  For 
example, the southeastern states of the United States have attracted German, Japanese, and 
Korean automakers by providing job training, local and state property tax exemptions, and site 
development assistance.  The MEED, on the other hand, cost about $25,000 per new job created, 
and the new jobs were provided to unemployed people, thereby reducing the deadweight cost 
associated with hiring others who would have been hired anyway.   
POLICY THEMES 
This paper reviews American evidence on the effectiveness of public policies at 
addressing permanent job loss and long-term unemployment.  The real and permanent solution to 
joblessness lies in private-sector job creation through business success.  Government efforts can 
provide a salve during unemployment, a stimulus to the aggregate economy, cultivation of labor 
supply, nurturing of labor demand, and facilitation of job matching.  This summary section 
reviews the potential for public employment policy success in difficult labor markets, current 
initiatives for linking UI with the ES for reemployment services, federal endorsement of targeted 
reemployment services, and current policy to stimulate labor demand.  Finally, the section offers 
speculation about other initiatives that could be tried or expanded. 
The Potential for Public Employment Policy 
Job search may seem futile when employers are rapidly shedding workers.  Indeed, the 
value of public spending on reemployment efforts can be questioned in severe economic times.  
However, even while new American UI claims exceeded 600,000 every week in early 2009, 
contemporaneous employment reports announced net wage and salary jobs declining at a 
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comparatively modest pace of about 600,000 per month.  Hiring in the U.S. economy continued 
at a rate of more than 4 million jobs per month.  In the American labor force of just over 154 
million people, there were 54.6 million jobs filled in the 12 months ending in March 2009 
(http://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.htm).  At any given time, about one-third of all American 
jobs have been newly filled in the previous 12 months.  That dynamism of the labor market is an 
axiom of public employment policy in the United States. 
Current Initiatives Linking UI and ES 
This paper has provided a review of studies documenting the value of requiring active job 
search by UI beneficiaries and linking UI to the ES.  Two recent efforts provide additional 
evidence that work search requirements and JSA affect the duration of insured unemployment: 1) 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) programs and 2) a Wisconsin reemployment 
demonstration in One-Stop Career Centers.  Both studies strengthened work search enforcement 
and linkages to reemployment services.  The REA initiative was a U.S. Department of Labor 
demonstration project with a budget of $20 million to provide assistance to states establishing 
new or significantly revamped REA programs.  REAs are an eligibility review program, run 
within the UI program without the participation of One-Stop center staff.  REA efforts were 
implemented in 21 states in 2005.  Federal funds for REAs were appropriated with the proviso 
that research would be conducted in the pilot states to learn if REAs could be a model for 
shortening jobless durations and reducing insured unemployment.21  Evidence from Minnesota 
suggests that REAs reduced the duration of UI benefit receipt by 1.2 weeks (Benus et al. 2008).  
                                                          
21 See the Employment and Training Administration’s Field Memorandum No. 17-04, “Fiscal Year (FY) 
2005 Unemployment Insurance (UI) Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment Grants,” dated August 12, 2004.   
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Recent federal initiatives have pumped millions of dollars into states to broaden the use of REA 
programs for UI beneficiaries. 
Another promising approach was embodied in the ambitious Wisconsin demonstration 
project, also sponsored by the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. 
Department of Labor.  It brings UI and One-Stop center staff together to provide reemployment 
services and eligibility reviews in the One-Stop center.  In this cooperative operations model, UI 
staff are out-stationed in the one-stop centers.  The Wisconsin demonstration, with its 
quasiexperimental evaluation design, provides further information about the cost-effectiveness of 
ES cooperation in the UI work test.  Those receiving additional attention for the work test in 
One-Stop centers shortened UI durations by 1.8 weeks and lowered benefit year compensation 
by $468 (Almandsmith 2005, p. 7).  
In addition to the favorable net impacts of labor exchange services, all studies evaluating 
the effectiveness of ES interventions consistently report very low costs per customer served by 
the public ES.  It is difficult to find reliable data on the cost per service, since most cost 
accounting is at the program level and not the service level.  Estimates derived from expenditure 
data for Georgia put the cost per staff-assisted service between $360 and $712 (O’Leary and 
Eberts 2004).  Jacobson and Petta (2000) put the average cost per staff-assisted service in Oregon 
and Washington at $330.  In comparison, training costs are at least $1,400, and they can be 
considerably higher (O’Leary and Eberts 2004).  Consequently, ES interventions are relatively 
inexpensive.  Combining inexpensive services with significant estimated benefits yields a 
benefit-cost ratio greater than 1.   
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Targeting Reemployment Services 
Technological developments in UI claims processing have reduced the interaction 
between UI program staff and jobless workers, thereby restricting monitoring of the work test 
and decreasing the number of personal referrals to reemployment services.  A countervailing 
impact is the increase in referrals to reemployment services through the WPRS system for 
claimants who are most likely to exhaust their entitlement to regular UI benefits.  The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) was signed into law by President Obama on 
February 17, 2009.  To provide states with administrative guidance for implementing 
employment policies enunciated in ARRA, the ETA on March 18, 2009, issued Training and 
Employment Guidance Letter (TEGL) 14-08 (Small 2009).  In this guidance letter, “the ETA 
strongly encourages [states] to take an expansive view of how [ARRA] funds can be integrated 
into transformational efforts to improve the effectiveness of the public workforce system” (p. 3). 
Furthermore, the letter says, “In utilizing reemployment services (RES) funding in 
[ARRA], ETA encourages states to consider the following: Collaboration between State 
Employment Service, Unemployment Insurance, and Labor Market Information Offices” (p. 21).  
On page 22, it outlines several actions for states to take: “The [ARRA] allows spending 
on information technology to better target and serve UI claimants. ETA encourages states to 
consider.  These include 
$ “Updating the state UI profiling model to improve effectiveness in targeting 
claimants. 
 
$ “Integrating and improving the communication and data transfer of UI claimant 
identification and characteristics data between the UI and One-Stop Career 
Center– or Wagner-Peyser Act–funded employment service. 
 
$ “Integrating LMI into a strategic decision–making system. 
 




The letter adds, “With the limited funds available and the large numbers of UI 
claimants that would benefit from reemployment services (RES), ETA encourages 
states to assess claimants through the use of existing statistical profiling models 
using claimant characteristics, as known from their initial UI claim, to help 
identify the most effective mix of interventions and services for different groups 
of UI claimants” (p. 21). 
 
However, the letter notes that “matching the types of services with the skills and abilities 
of claimants to be served will vary from state to state depending on the type of profiling model 
used, the local labor market dynamics, and the claimant characteristics” (p. 21).  
The themes recommended by USDOL (2009) for targeting reemployment services follow 
the principles of targeting employment services embodied in the WPRS system, the Frontline 
Decision Support System (FDSS) developed by Eberts and O’Leary (2002), and the Service 
Outcomes and Monitoring System (SOMS) proposed for Canada (Colpitts 2002).   
Incumbent Worker Training 
As with evaluations of work sharing, questions about deadweight have been raised 
regarding incumbent worker training.  By “incumbent worker training,” we mean publicly 
supported training within enterprises by current employers for workers identified as being at risk 
of job loss.  Such workers are retrained with the promise of new skills and a new job along with 
employer retention.  Among the types of job training provided to both displaced and 
disadvantaged workers, on-the-job employer-provided training has been identified as one of the 
most effective at promoting employment and earnings.  Incumbent worker training is gaining 
attention in the current policy environment. 
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Wage Subsidies to Employers 
Despite the weak effects of wage subsidies documented in this paper based on findings 
from evaluations of the Dayton, Illinois, wage subsidy experiment and the Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit, a new tax credit has taken effect in the United States.  On March 8, 2010, President 
Obama signed the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act.  This new $17.5 billion 
legislation includes new tax benefits directly related to hiring employees.  The new tax 
incentives for businesses to hire unemployed workers are: 1) payroll tax exemption of the 
employers’ share of Social Security taxes on wages paid (6.2 percent) to these workers after 
March 18, 2010, and 2) employer tax credit of up to $1,000 per worker.  In order to qualify for 
the business tax credits new employees must be: 1) hired between February 3, 2010 and January 
1, 2011, and 2) newly-hired employees must have been unemployed during the 60 days prior to 
starting work, or worked fewer than 40 hours for someone else during that 60-day period.  
Earlier tries at hiring subsidies were little used, giving rise to speculation that hiring subsidies 
stigmatize workers in the eyes of employers.  With tepid employer demand for workers, this 
latest attempt at hiring subsidies has been adopted as a relatively inexpensive effort to stimulate 
job demand.  However, some commentators have asserted that the meager incentives offered will 
have similarly small effects on employer hiring (Bartik and Bishop 2009).   
Work Sharing 
Work sharing was not one of the main topics discussed in the body of this paper, since 
the lone U.S. evaluation study of work sharing—done in California in the 1980s—found that a 
work sharing scheme operating through the UI system neither preserved nor added to jobs in the 
long run.  Additionally, in the United States there is some legal uncertainty about the status of UI 
work sharing subsidies payable under laws in 19 states using UI Unemployment Trust Fund 
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reserves.  However, widespread use of work sharing in these 19 states and throughout Europe 
during the recent recession has rekindled interest in work sharing.  Under the typical work 
sharing arrangement, a worker is paid a percentage of his full UI weekly benefit amount that is 
equal to his percentage reduction in weekly hours of work. 
New federal legislation to clarify the federal-state legal uncertainty over work sharing is 
likely to move toward enactment in the near future.  While there is no evidence at the microlevel 
that work sharing saves or expands jobs within firms, evidence from WARN-related research 
suggests that informing workers and slowing the rate of discharge can soften the impacts of mass 
layoffs on local communities.  Prolonging employer attachments, even at reduced hours and 
weekly earnings, maintains eligibility for employer-provided health insurance and workers’ 
compensation insurance, and it keeps intact work-related networks for active job search and 
outplacement.   
Wage Insurance 
Permanent job loss causes significant declines in lifetime earnings patterns.  The 
reduction in future earnings prospects can also prolong job search because of unrealistic wage 
expectations.  Some have argued these conditions require wage insurance.  Unions have strongly 
opposed wage insurance, viewing it as a public policy that would support a downward wage 
spiral.  With interest in wage subsidies tepid because of stigma effects, and unemployment 
exhaustion rates above 50 percent for regular benefits plus the potential for nearly two years of 
UI including extended benefits, a modification in UI could be tried.  A modification to the UI 
earnings disregard could create a system that would be like wage insurance in three ways:  1) it 
would avoid carrying a stigma because it would be paid directly to the unemployed without 
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employer knowledge, 2) it could shorten jobless spells by lowering the market reservation wage, 
and 3) it could gradually decline as hours and earnings rise on a new job.   
In the context of Canadian EI, the earnings disregard could be raised from 25 percent to 
50 percent with a 50-cent weekly benefit reduction for every dollar earned beyond that level.  
Break-even earnings would be 2.5 times the weekly benefit amount.  Compensable periods could 
be limited to the current benefit year, or they could be extended until the dollar benefit 
entitlement is exhausted while participants were earning income in the job market.  A field 
experiment in Washington State suggested that liberalizing the earnings reduction formula would 
measurably increase reported market earnings for program participants during their period of 
benefit receipt (O’Leary 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
We have reviewed results from several employment programs that have endeavored to 
address worker displacement.  Some of these may be ready for program adoption; others are ripe 
for policy development and testing before widespread implementation.  Evidence suggests policy 
should pursue the following six goals:  1) a continuous connection of unemployment 
compensation recipients to reemployment services, 2) skill training closely connected to 
employer requirements and opportunities, 3) earnings transition schemes to help workers adjust 
to major declines in lifetime earnings patterns, 4) efforts to maintain and strengthen employer-
employee relationships, 5) information channels to employees and communities about impending 
employment disruptions, and, for most of these programs, 6) targeting guided by net impact 
principles ensuring the best returns on public investments.   
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American evidence on public policy related to displaced workers suggests there is no 
silver bullet likely to solve all worker displacement problems at once.  However, there are many 
arrows in the quiver that together may help ease the problem and improve labor market 
outcomes.  
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